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Summary
This study uses network analysis to evaluate how swine movements in Argentina could 
contribute to disease spread. Movement data for the 2014-2017 period were obtained from 
Argentina’s online livestock traceability registry and categorized as follows: animals of high 
genetic value sent to other farms, animals to or from markets, animals sent to finisher operations 
and slaughterhouse. A network analysis was carried out considering the first three movement 
types. First, descriptive, centrality and cohesion measures were calculated for each movement 
type and year. Next, to determine if networks had a small-world topology, these were compared 
with the results from random Erdös–Rényi network simulations. Then, the basic reproductive 
number (R0) of the genetic network, the group of farms with higher potential for disease spread 
standing at the top of the production chain, was calculated to identify farms acting as super-
spreaders. Finally, their external biosecurity scores were evaluated. The genetic network in 
Argentina presented a scale-free and small world topology. Thus, we estimate that disease 
spread would be fast, preferably to highly connected nodes and with little chances of being 
contained. Throughout the study, 31 farms were identified as super-spreaders in the genetic 
network for all years, while other 55 were super-spreaders at least once, from an average of 
1613 farms per year. Interestingly, removal of less than 5% of higher degree and betweenness 
farms resulted in a >90% reduction of R0 indicating that few farms have a key role in disease 
spread. When biosecurity scores of the most relevant super-spreaders were examined, it was 
evident that many were at risk of introducing and disseminating new pathogens across the whole 
of Argentina’s pig production network. These results highlight the usefulness of establishing 
targeted surveillance and intervention programs, emphasizing the need for better biosecurity 
scores in Argentinean swine production units, especially in super-spreader farms.
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Animal movements are one of the major means for infectious disease transmission in livestock 
populations (Fritzemeier et al., 2000; Mansley et al., 2003, Gilbert et al., 2005; Kao et al., 2006; 
Fèvre et al., 2006; Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006). Among other factors, the likelihood of introduction 
of infectious agents in a farm will be a function of the number of movements in a given time span 
(Enright and Kao, 2016). Similarly, farms with poor biosecurity scores are especially vulnerable to 
pathogen introduction (Amass et al., 2004; Dewulf and Immerseel, 2018). Once the agent is 
introduced, disease spread in a country will largely depend on farms contact network (Thakur et 
al., 2014; VanderWaal et al., 2018) and the biosecurity measures implemented therein (Gibbens 
et al., 2001). Consequently, restriction of animal movements is usually imposed to limit disease 
spread (Stärk et al., 2006; OIE 2011, Salman et al., 2013).
Network analysis has been widely used in veterinary epidemiology to assess and describe the 
spread of infectious diseases based on the interactions among farms or individuals (Keeling and 
Eames, 2005; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Martinez-Lopez et al, 2009; Nöremark et al, 2011; 
Dorjee et al, 2013; Thakur et al, 2014; Lentz et al, 2016; Marquetoux et al., 2016, Salines et al, 
2017). Farms that are central in the flow of animal movement´s because of their large number of 
trading partners have an important role in the spread of diseases (Dubé et al., 2009). Therefore, 
a good understanding of animal movements is necessary to develop rational and targeted 
interventions to limit disease spread (Nugent and McLeod, 2004; Frössling et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, a small fraction of the population might contribute disproportionately to the 
spread of an infectious disease. Woolhouse et al., (1997) formulated the empirical 80/20 rule 
according to which 20% of the population contributes to 80% of transmission events. Those 
individuals in the 20% are called super-spreaders (Keeling and Eames, 2005). The same occurs 
when transmission is considered not between individuals of a population but between discrete 
populations in an area, for example, between herds (Woolhouse et al., 2005; Volkova et al., 
2010). Taking this feature into account may be useful for the development of targeted 
intervention strategies such as the improvement of biosecurity or surveillance measures upon 
the incursion of an exotic disease in the country (Frössling et al., 2012). This is especially relevant 
for Argentina’s pig industry whose steady growth over the past decade partly owes to the 
country’s free status for most major livestock diseases (Monterubbianesi et al., 2016, Carpinetti 
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In countries with such competitive advantage, the introduction and potential spread of a new 
pathogen —particularly one of easy transmission and dissemination— can have catastrophic 
consequences. Adopting preventive measures against the occurrence and spread of infectious 
agents along with surveillance systems for early detection of exotic diseases and possible 
contingency plans is paramount.  
Pig farming in Argentina totals to 962,881 commercial productive sows distributed in 16,408 
farms. Producers that raise pigs for their own consumption are called non-commercial producers 
while those selling pigs (to other farms or slaughterhouses) are referred to as commercial 
producers and are assigned an identification number (called RENSPA) in an electronic registry. 
Nearly 1,922 commercial pig farms have more than 100 sows, 1,935 have between 50 to 100 
sows and 12,325 have between 10 to 50 sows (National Food Safety and Quality Service, 2016). 
Argentina’s commercial productive chain is best described as a pyramid structure 
(Figure_S1_SuppInfo) where officially registered suppliers of animals of high genetic value (gilts, 
sows or boars) and semen collection centers (boar nucleus) stand at the top. Gilt suppliers serve 
farrow-to-finish and farrow-to-weaning, and, besides these, there are finishing farms that receive 
weaners or growers or cull sows (7 kg or more) from different origins and raise them until they 
reach market weight (ca. 110-120 kg). All commercial farms send animals to slaughterhouses and 
occasionally they may also send animals to fairs or markets (Iglesias and Ghezan, 2013). The 
56.97% (1,095/1,922) of farms are farrow-to-finish, only 1.14% (22/1922) are farrow-to-weaning 
and there are 41.88% (805/1,922) finishers farms, but there are no farms integrating these two.
At present, in Argentina, all livestock movements are electronically recorded by the National 
Food Safety and Quality Service (SENASA) using an online integrated information management 
system for animal health (SIGSA) which centralizes each farm’s health information (e.g. animal 
category, owner, location, commercial inventories, incoming and outgoing animal movements 
and health record). Each farm is identified with a RENSPA number used to track movements in 
SIGSA. The only restriction on movements between farms is that of transporting live pigs from 
Aujeszky’s disease-positive farms to negative establishments. However, this program is aimed at 
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with fewer (SENASA, 2009). Despite that, all animal movements must be registered in the 
electronic system; SIGSA (SENASA, 2017). 
The purpose of our study was to characterize the network of commercial pig population 
movements in Argentina for a better understanding of potential disease spread together with the 
identification of super-spreader farms for targeted control and surveillance measures. The 
biosecurity level of those super-spreaders was evaluated in relation to their role in the 
transmission of diseases through animal movements. 
2. Materials and Methods: 
2.1. Type of movements.
Taking into account different risk sources for disease transmission posed by different animal 
categories such as breeders, weaners, etc. (Pileri  and Mateu, 2016, Dunowska, 2018), their 
destination (e.g. movements to other farms versus movements to slaughterhouses) (Fèvre et al, 
2006; Kao et al, 2007) and the pig production chain in Argentina, the following movement types 
were distinguished:
1) Animals of high genetic value (Genetic network): movement of high genetic merit animals 
(gilts, sows and boars) from an officially registered supplier to a farm whose destination is other 
farm, for example: a farrow-to-finish or farrow-to-weaning farm, but neither a slaughterhouse, a 
fair/market nor a finishing farm.  
2) Markets: movements whose departure or destination holding is a fair/market, regardless of 
the category of transported animals (sows, boars, gilts, etc.). 
3) Finishers: Movements whose destination is a finishing farm.
4) Slaughterhouse: movements whose destination is a slaughterhouse, registered as such in the 
National Sanitary Registry of Agricultural Producers (RENSPA).
According to Argentinean regulations, movements between establishments having different 
RENSPA identification numbers must be recorded, even when involving animals from the same 
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different sites of the same farm, sometimes movements from a nursery to a fattening unit are 
required to be registered. These movements (2.89%) where the origin and destination were the 
same farm were excluded from the network, since no mixing with animals from another origin 
took place and, in practical terms, pigs never abandoned the same farm.
2.2 Data collection
To analyze pig movements from 2014 to 2017, we accessed SIGSA and downloaded the total 
number of movement control forms (called DT-e) corresponding to this period, their source and 
target RENSPAs, animal category and number of animals moved (SENASA, 2017).
Pending (procedure initiated, movement not made) or expired animal DT-es (unconfirmed 
movement at destination unit upon 5 days DT-e was issued) were discarded 1.93% 
(10,305/534,255). Additionally, 86 registered movements with obvious errors (unlikely number 
of animals transported in a single truck, etc.) for the 2014-2017 period were discarded. However, 
this represented a low number of entries (86 out of 523,950 registered movements).  
2.3 Network analysis
Directed networks for genetic, market and finishing movements were built for each year (2014-
2017). In these unimodal networks, nodes represented either a farm or a market and edges 
represented the pig movements among them. The slaughter network was excluded because it 
posed a minor risk for farm-to-farm disease spread.  
 We calculated different descriptors at network level for each year and movement type such as 
graph diameter, average path length, reciprocity, clustering coefficient and modularity. Then, we 
determined the main cohesive blocks and the giant strongly and weakly connected components 
in each graph. In addition, based on centrality measures at node level, we calculated weighted 
and unweighted out and in-degree and betweenness, as these values and those previously 
mentioned usually correlate with the probability of infectious disease introduction or spread and 
the size of the epidemic (Christley et al., 2005; Kao et al., 2006). The variable to generate the 
weighted measures was the number of animals involved in each movement. Table_S1_SuppInfo 
includes the definition of the different network measures used in the analysis. Spearman 
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type, in order to assess the relation between the number of contacts in and out of the nodes. 
Data were analyzed using the iGraph package (Csárdi and Nepusz, 2006) within R environment (R 
development Core Team, 2014).
Degree distribution of the genetic, finisher and market networks in the last year (2017) were 
analyzed to determine if they fitted a power-law distribution. This allowed for the identification 
of super-spreaders in those populations, that is, nodes accounting for most of the contacts and 
therefore making a major contribution to disease spread. In a power-law distribution, it is 
generally assumed that P(X=x) is proportional to x−alpha, where x is a positive number and α is 
greater than 1. In many real-world cases, the power-law behavior kicks in only above a threshold 
value xmin. This was done following the guidelines proposed by Clauset et al., 2009. This approach 
combines maximum-likelihood fitting methods with goodness-of-fit tests on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic and likelihood ratios. The cut-off value (Xmin) and the value of alpha for a given 
xmin were estimated by conducting a hypothesis test to establish whether the observed 
distribution fitted a power-law. The package used was powerRlaw (Colin and Gillespie, 2015) 
within R environment (R development Core Team, 2014).
Furthermore, average path lengths and clustering coefficients from the observed networks were 
compared with the confidence interval (percentiles 2.5 and 97.5) for the same descriptors 
obtained from 10,000 Erdös–Rényi (1960) network simulations. The method simulates a network 
with random connections whose nodes and edges were of the same size as those in our study. If 
the clustering coefficients of the random network were smaller than those of the original 
calculation and the average path lengths were longer, networks were said to satisfy a small-
world topology (Newman, 2000; Marquetoux et al., 2016).
2.4. Effect of network properties on the basic reproduction number (R0)
We followed Volkova et al., 2010 and Woolhouse et al., 2005 to estimate the basic reproduction 
number (R0) of the genetic network. This methodology is based on the fact that the 
heterogeneity in contact patterns enhances the transmission of infectious diseases through the 
network and estimates R0 by taking into account the average in- and out-degree and the variance 
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explore potential spread of a highly transmissible disease in the network (Volkova et al., 2010). 
To evaluate the impact of targeted interventions on super-spreaders in disease transmission we 
used the approach proposed by Marquetoux et al., 2016. Genetic farms were listed in a 
descending order according to the total degree and betweenness values. Successive simulations 
were carried out, removing farms one by one, starting from those with the highest degree 
values. For each simulation, a ratio between the R0 of the network after removing one or more 
farms and the total network’s R0 without farms removed was calculated. Therefore, the ratio 
represented the fraction of the total R0 contributed by each farm or group of farms removed. The 
same procedure was repeated based on betweenness values. Then, farms which contributed to a 
90% R0 reduction value were identified in each network, according to any of the two removal 
criteria (total degree or betweenness). When this calculation was done for each of the four years 
studied, it was possible to identify what farms in the genetic network acted as super-spreaders 
all throughout the study. The calculation was not done for finishers because these farms send 
animals to slaughterhouses or other finishers and, as result, their incidence in disease spread is 
much lower.  
2.5. Targeted interventions: biosecurity in farms with a dominant role in disease spread
The biosecurity score of those farms that contributed to a 90% of R0 reduction in the genetic 
network was extracted from Alarcón et al., 2019. In that study, a score named ‘risk reduction 
percentage’ was calculated for each genetic farm. Briefly, that was the ratio between the 
summary of all the biosecurity measures implemented in the farm at that time versus an ideal 
situation (i.e., the implementation of all different biosecurity measures). Percentage values lower 
than 95% imply that the adopted biosecurity measures in the farm are not optimal and that there 
is room for improvement. Further details about the methodology to calculate these scores can 
be found in Allepuz et al., 2018 and Alarcón et al., 2019. In our study, the risk reduction 
percentage score was plotted against the order in which the different nodes were removed in 
the above-mentioned analysis. Then, for farms identified as super-spreaders for a given year, the 
number of farms receiving animals from them and the number of farms supplying them with 
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et al., 2005) but also when breeding pigs come from diverse origins (Dewulf and Immerseel, 
2018).  
3. Results
3.1. General description of pig productive system in Argentina
A yearly description of the number of pigs and movement records in Argentina is described in 
Figure 1. Between 2014 and 2017, the total number of pigs increased by 8.0% (5,863,281 vs. 
6,375,808 in 2014 and 2017), 9.0% (6,375,808 vs. 7,008,726) and 6.9% (7,008,726 vs. 7,525,613) 
respectively; whereas movements increased by 6.7% (119,265 vs. 127,826), 7.0% (127,826 vs. 
137,398) and 1.4% (137,398 vs. 139,375). Throughout, these four years, an average of 6,693,357 
animals and 130,966 movements were officially recorded. Among the latter, 83.6% 
(109,518/130,966) were to slaughterhouses, 3.3% (4338/130,966) were movements of animals 
coming from genetic establishments, 3.0% (3928/130,966) were movements to finishing 
holdings, 2.9% (3782/130,966) were movements of piglets among sites of the same farms and 
1.2% (1617/130,966) were movements from or to markets. Finally, 5.9% (7784/130,966), average 
for the four years, of the movements were not classified in any of the networks built because 
they corresponded to imports (destined to quarantine stations) or exports (animals sent to the 
border), returns (animals not received at the destination farm) or animals used for research 
purposes, among other categories. 
On average, 5.6 million pigs were slaughtered each year. Of these, 4.9 million came from farrow-
to-finish farms and the rest from finishers or genetic farms. From the 110 establishments 
officially registered as high genetic merit breeder suppliers, 95, 94, 91 and 86 of them moved 
animals from 2014 to 2017, respectively. These farms contributed to the transportation of 
animals to 1,546 farms (40,000 gilts, 10,000 sows and 1,500 males) during this period.  The 
discrepancy between the total number of registered genetic farms and those moving animals 
results from farms being on a temporary cease of operations, change of genetic sources (re-
stocking), depopulations, etc. 
In the studied period, an average 215 (210 to 219) finishing holdings received animals. Finishers 
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to 134) of the incoming movements were from another finisher farm. Regarding markets, 
incoming movements were on average 1,543 per year (1,393 to 1,672), but the outgoing 
movements were only 75 per year (64 to 80), a value that revealed a problem with the official 
records of the outgoing movements in such markets.
3.2. Networks description of pig movements
Table 1 shows the descriptive and cohesion measures at network level for the year 2017 (other 
years are shown in Table_S2_SuppInfo). The number of nodes in the genetic network (1444) was 
higher than in the market (356) and finisher networks (855), whereas density (the fraction of all 
possible edges realized in the network) was higher in the market (0.011) and finisher networks 
(0.005) that genetic network (0.002).
As shown by its diameter, the distance between the most separate farms/nodes in the genetic 
network was six hops, whereas in the market and finisher networks it was only two. The average 
path length from the different networks ranged from 1.005 (market network) to 1.758 (genetic 
network) and the clustering coefficient varied from 0 (market network) to 0.071 (genetic). 
For the genetic network, the clustering coefficient weighted by the number of moved animals 
was higher than for the Erdös–Rényi network, 0.0071 in the original vs. percentile (2.5) = 0.001; 
percentile (97.5) = 0.005 in the random network, but lower for the finisher and market network. 
In contrast, when the comparison was made using the average path length values of the genetic, 
finisher and market networks (1.76; 1.12, 1.01), these were shorter than those 2.5 and 97.5 
percentiles of the random network (7.86-8.25; 5.11-5.22-4.48-.65). Accordingly, only the genetic 
network fulfilled the requirements of a small-world topology.
The analysis also revealed the existence of different communities (Table 1, Figure_S2_SuppInfo). 
Reciprocity was slightly above zero only in the genetic network, indicating a small fraction of bi-
directional movements within this population. This last result was also evidenced when we 
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In the present study, the giant strongly connected component (GSCC) comprised almost all the 
nodes of the genetics network and all the nodes of the market and finishers network (Table 1). 
This indicated highly unidirectional networks, particularly for the genetic one, which showed the 
lowest occurrence of reversal links. On the other hand, the weakly giant connected component 
(GWCC) in the finisher network comprised several components consisting of many nodes of a 
larger size and higher modularity whereas in the market network values were standard. 
Results for degree and betweenness at node level in the network for 2017 (Table 2, 
Figure_S3_SuppInfo) exhibited a large variation between nodes and highly asymmetrical 
distributions for each measure. Supplementary Table S3, shows these measures for the rest of 
the networks (2014-2016). The nodes with the lowest degree had values of 0 or 1, and the 
maximum of degree values in networks ranged from 299 to 971 in the different years. 
Unweighted degree ranged from minimums of 1 in the different networks up to maximums of 
347 to 971 edges according to network, with a higher preponderance of out edges in the genetic 
and finisher network compared to markets (Table 2). The Spearman correlation coefficient 
between the in-degree and the out-degree ranged from -0.2 to -0.7, with clearly no linear 
relationships. This value was not calculated for the market network because one of the markets 
concentrated most of the movements, 76.9 % (1,243/1,617), an average for four years. Figure 2 
shows the relationship between in-degree and out-degree for the four-year period in the genetic 
network. Figure_S4_SuppInfo shows a similar graph for the finisher network.
In-degree and out-degree 2017 values at node level were fitted to a power-law distribution 
model and the tail of the observed distribution satisfied it (exponent alpha values: in-degree/out-
degree: genetic network=4.2/1.8, finisher=2.3/2.4, market= 1.6/3.3. Xmin in-degree/out-degree: 
genetic network= 9/14, finisher= 31/9, market= 12/10). The goodness-of-fit test via a 
bootstrapping procedure (Clauset et al, 2009) used for tested the hypothesis of whether the data 
follows a power-law distribution, performed were unable to reject the null hypothesis (p-
values=0.1-0.9) in all cases. Hence, the observed distributions indicated that the power-law 
model was plausible for all networks.
3.3. Targeted interventions on super-spreaders: carry over effects on potential disease 
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The removal of 2.87—4.0% of farms (2014=66/1,637; 2015=51/1,773; 2016=63/1,599 and 
2017/1,444=48), out of an average of 1,613/year, from the genetic network allowed for a 90% 
reduction of the R0 value in the different years. The set of farms contributing to that 90% were 
considered as super-spreaders. In total, 86 farms were identified as such in the four-year period 
studied, 31 of which (2014=31/66 (46.7%), 2015=31/51(60.8%), 2016=31/63 (49.2%) and 
2017=31/48 (64.6%)) were super-spreaders every year, 14/86 (16.3%) 3 years, 21/86 (24.4%) 2 
years and 20/86 (23.3%) only one.  Figure 3 shows R0 reduction in 2017. In that year, 48 farms 
were identified as super-spreaders.
To assess the relationship between super-spreader farms biosecurity scores and their 
contribution to the reduction of R0, the score for the risk reduction percentage in case of disease 
introduction was plotted against the order in which farms were removed in the R0 calculations in 
2017 (Figure 4). Interestingly, super-spreaders sent animals to a median of 20 farms with a 
maximum of 197 destination farms per year, highlighting also a significant difference in the 
probability of onward transmission among this group (Figure 5). This indicates that the 
introduction of a transmissible agent in one of those farms would have a huge impact on the 
spread of infection, as evidenced by the maximum number of infected farms in a possible 
epidemic in the genetic network, estimated by the Giant Strongly Connected Components, (Table 
1).
4. DISCUSSION
This study is the first network analysis of pig movements in Argentina. Data used were 
downloaded from SENASA’s electronic registry and comprised all pig movements from or to 
commercial holdings in the country, except for a minor proportion of movements destined to a 
quarantine facility, animals moved for research purposes and undetermined records. Overall, 
more than 93% of movements were used in the analysis so data is highly representative of 
Argentina’s situation. 
Regarding the degree measure, the Spearman correlation coefficients between the in-degree and 
the out-degree for the genetic and finisher networks were negative, low for the genetic one and 
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farms would mostly act as spreaders though they can also be recipients of the disease. This is 
consistent with the swine production structure where gilt producers supply many farms.
In the present case, the genetic network fulfilled all the requirements for being a small-world 
topology and a scale-free network, in agreement with what other researchers found (Relun et al., 
2016; Lee et al., 2017, Salines et al., 2017). 
In contrast, the finisher and market networks did not. This apparent contradiction can be 
explained by the nature of the networks themselves. For finishers, most of the outgoing 
movements were to slaughterhouses and, in consequence, they were removed from the 
database (dead-end movement). In the case of the market network, a single market accounted 
for three quarters of the movements. 
The calculation of R0 and the reduction of this value because of farm removals were only done 
for the genetic network, since finishers were dead ends regarding transmission. As seen in Figure 
3, removal of farms based on degree resulted in a faster decrease of R0 in agreement with 
Marquetoux et al., 2016. However, some farms with a very high degree might have a very low 
betweenness and they would not be recognized as super-spreaders based only on this last node 
centrality measure. Both measures might be relevant for disease spread, since degree is 
correlated with the probability of a farm receiving/spreading disease and betweenness with the 
ability of a farm to link groups of farms. By using both degree and betweenness, a better 
identification of super-spreaders could be made. For the genetic network, removal of less than 
5% of the nodes resulted in a ≥90% reduction of the R0 indicating the significant role of those 
farms in disease spread. Moreover, those farms are obvious targets for surveillance, contingency 
plans and improved biosecurity plans; as the super-spreader biosecurity scores varies between 
0.11 to 0.80 (Q1=0.29, Median=0.39, Q3=0.48). Of the total of super-spreader farms identified 
per year, half of them were the same during the three or four analyzed years. Different reasons 
can explain this result, for example, some of these farms might have stopped breeding high-
genetic merit pigs for commercial purposes to keep them for themselves. We also observed a 
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economic crisis in the Argentinean pig production sector (El Productor Porcino, 2018), which 
resulted in the loss of many small and medium-sized pig farms.
The data used in the calculation of the biosecurity score (risk mitigation percentage) were 
obtained from biosecurity surveys conducted in Argentina by registered veterinarians (Senasa) 
and a panel of experts held in Argentina, as described in Alarcón et al., 2019. This score presents 
some limitations, since farmers’ answers when being surveyed could be inaccurate. 
Consequently, 80% of the farmers were contacted by their veterinarians, advisors and 
laboratories so as to check the data collected. Further details can be found in Allepuz et al., 2018 
and Alarcón et al., 2019. 
As seen in Figure 4, super-spreaders biosecurity scores in the genetic network can be highly 
improved. It is important to note that many of those super-spreaders had contact with many 
different farms. Therefore, if the disease reached those super-spreaders, the epidemic would 
probably affect most of Argentina’s pig production system due to the low biosecurity in most of 
the commercial pigs’ farms of the country (Alarcón et al, 2019). Therefore, a targeted plan for 
motivating all Argentinean farmers, especially super-spreader owners, as regards biosecurity 
improvement should be a national priority. In addition, targeted surveillance for critical 
pathogens should focus on those farms. Risk analysis estimating the entry pathways of different 
pathogens to super-spreaders; as well as an improvement in the biosecurity level of the receiving 
farms; are also highly needed to reduce the risk of disease spread in the country.
Network analysis has been described as a useful methodology to characterize pigs movements 
and the impact that the contact structure has on the spread of diseases (Lentz et al., 2016; Schulz 
et al., 2017; Sterchi  et al., 2019) in countries such as Canada (Dorjee et al., 2013; Thakur et al., 
2014), the USA (Lee et al., 2017), Germany (Büttner et al., 2015), France (Salines et al., 2017) and 
Kenya and Uganda (Lichioti et al., 2016). When comparing these studies to our results, we realize 
that Argentinean networks have a smaller diameter (2-6) than networks in the USA, Canada, 
France, Germany, Kenya, and Uganda: 9, 3.25, 6 to 20, and 7, respectively. The average path 
length of Argentina’s genetic network is similar to that in France and Canada, but shorter than in 
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but smaller than in the USA and Canada (Lichioti et al., 2016, Lee et al., 2017, Salines et al., 
2017). Thus, our networks are smaller yet more rapidly interconnected (1 or 2 movements vs. 3 
to 5), despite not being integrated in combined management systems as in leading pig-farming 
countries. The market network had a higher density than the genetic and finisher network. The 
data obtained for the latter and degree distribution values in our study were similar to other 
countries such as Germany and Canada (Thakur et al., 2014). 
Following other works’ data aggregation methods (Woolhouse et al., 2005; Volkova et al., 2010; 
Marquetoux et al., 2016), we considered a one-year time span. It could be argued that by using 
such period we are overestimating the impact of the observed super-spreaders, since most 
diseases would be detected in the population within less than a year’s time of circulation. Other 
studies analyzed movements monthly or every six months (Lee et al., 2017, Salines et al., 2017). 
Yet, as pointed out by Buttner et al., 2015, monthly analyses reduce the number of nodes in the 
network significantly, network fragmentation is higher and indirect contacts are underestimated. 
Be that as it may, pig movements in Argentina do not show a remarkable seasonal pattern 
(Dirección Nacional de Producción Ganadera, 2017). Moreover, given the nature of commercial 
pig production in the country, where practically all farms operate with weekly farrowing batches, 
the number of movements is distributed evenly throughout the year (an average of 8.3% 
movements each month with a 0.7% standard deviation). In our opinion, the identification of 
super-spreaders should not be affected by the time scale chosen.
It is worth noting that outgoing movements from fairs or markets were not being properly 
recorded by the system, as evidenced by the disproportionately higher number of ingoing 
movements compared to outgoing. The most likely cause is that outgoing movement DT-e forms 
were issued, but confirmation of arrival to destination was not registered by the recipient farm. 
Therefore, the DT-e was considered expired by the system. This emphasizes the need for 
educating all people involved in the recording of movements and raising awareness on the 
importance of having accurate data. 
As Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006, we classified movements following an origin-destination criterion 
(market, genetic, slaughter) for a better analysis of the different levels in Argentina’s pig 
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represented as pertaining to the same class, in order to have unimodal networks for all kind of 
movements. It is true though that in the market network there are few nodes that do not 
represent pig farms but markets. Despite that, we did not draw a distinction between nodes 
because in both cases the number of movements, number of moved animals and origins were 
similar.
In summary, in this study we identified pig farms with a critical role in disease transmission in 
Argentina and we examined their biosecurity level. Our findings showed that supers-spreaders 
were also at risk of introducing diseases due to their limited biosecurity; and although an 
improvement in the biosecurity of all farms in the country is necessary; are key priority targets 
for prevention and intervention actions.
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TABLES
Table 1. Network descriptive and cohesion measures according to movement types for 2017.
Networks measures Genetic Finisher Market
Number of nodes 1,444 855 356
Number of edges 3,417 3,238 1,317
Density 0.002 0.005 0.011
Diameter 6 2 2
Average path length 1.758 1.124 1.005
Reciprocity ratio 0.014 0 0
Clustering Coefficient or Transitivity 0.007 0.001 0
Number of cohesive blocks (Communties) 185 105 22
Giant Weakly connected components (GWC) 16 99 16
Giant Strongly connected components (GSC) 1435 855 356










This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Table 2. Summary of distributional aspects (minimum, quartiles, median and maximum) for four main centrality measures (i.e. total, in- and out-
degree, and betweenness) at node level for each movement-type of networks.  For each column, the value at the right is unweighted and the value 
after the dash is weighted by the number of animals (year 2017).
Genetic network Finishers network Market network
Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Total degree 1/1 1/4 2/12 4/33 347/4719 1/1 1/23 2/71 6/293 386/67200 1/1 1/13 2/40 6/127 971/27268
In degree 0/0 1/3 2/11 3/30 46/2760 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1 386/67200 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 971/27268
Out degree 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 330/4029 0/0 1/2 1/30 4/116 110/67200 0/0 1/3 1/25.5 5/100 32/1464
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FIGURE LEGENDS
Figure 1. Diagram of commercial pig movements in Argentina, in 2017. Each element of the pig 
chain (suppliers of animals of high genetic value, farrow-to-finish farms, finishers, etc.) is 
represented by a shadowed square with an indication of the number of farms or locations (white 
box). Movements between two elements of the chain are represented by lines. The thickness of 
the line is proportional to the number of transported animals. For each line, two values are 
shown: the first indicates the number of movements between two elements of the pig chain 
(from location a to location b); the second -between parentheses- indicates the number of 
transported pigs. Lines with a dot indicate breeders’ flow (female or male).
Figure 2. Scatterplot of the unweighted in-degree versus the unweighted out-degree for the 
genetic network. The year of each network is indicated above the plot. Spearman correlation 
coefficient (2014 to 2017): -0.07, -0.11, -0.13 and -0.16).
Figure 3. Impact of targeted removal of farms on R0 value expressed in relative terms (reduced 
network/full network) based on two potential spread measures: unweighted total degree (blue) 
and unweighted betweenness (red) in descending order (from higher to lower degree or 
betweenness) for genetic farms in 2017.
Figure 4. Distribution of farms contributing to a 90% reduction of R0 in the genetic network. The 
Y-axis represents the order in which farms in the network were removed, from the first to the 
one that reached a 90% reduction of the R0.  The X-axis represents the percentage of risk 
mitigation for introduction of a disease attributable to biosecurity measures.
Figure 5. Aggregated in-degree and out-degree for super-spreaders. Each graph depicts the 
number of farms sending animals to super-spreaders in a given year (in-degree) and the number 
of farms that super-spreaders of genetic networks send animals to (out-degree).
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